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The “future of the welfare state” in Europe is
becoming a common theme for discussion among
policymakers and academics. This is well illustrated
by the 2003 CESifo Munich Economic Summit, at
which several participants commented on the
prospective demise of the welfare state, or at least
some of its elements, or on ways that it, or at least
some of its important features, might be preserved.
The “welfare state”can of course mean many things.
For the purposes of the present discussion,I propose
to focus on fiscal policies. It is of course simplistic to
speak only of the financial aspects of the welfare
state, since a wide range of regulations (on wages,
working conditions, etc.) accompany welfare state
policies.1 When viewed from this perspective, the
most essential feature of the welfare state is that it
redistributes economic resources.This redistribution
takes many forms: redistribution from rich to poor
(through taxation and cash transfers) is one part of
the total picture, but so is redistribution from the
healthy to the sick (through publicly financed health
systems), from the employed to the unemployed
(through unemployment insurance programs), and
from the young to the old (through public pension
systems), to name only a few.
These policies and programs are seen by some as
crucial elements of a fair and compassionate society,
protecting people against many of life’s hazards,pro-
viding encouragement and hope to those who are
disadvantaged by birth or by random forces beyond
their control. Others look at the same welfare state
and see powerful interests using the coercive force of
government to take resources from the weak and
transfer these resources toward themselves. It is all
very well to invoke justice and fairness in a political
debate, but we can all cite instances where en-
trenched industrial, labor, demographic, regional,
and other interest groups use the tax, expenditure,
and regulatory powers of the state to protect them-
selves at the expense of others who are politically,
and often economically, relatively disadvantaged. In
this,as in so many cases,we do well to remember the
old adage about the alignment of policy opinion and
self-interest: “where you stand depends on where
you sit.” Or, as that iconoclast H.L. Mencken once
wrote,“Altruism,when analyzed,usually turns out to
be self-interest dressed up in a long-tailed coat.”
In this discussion,it is my intention neither to praise
the welfare state nor to bury it.Rather,my goal is to
discuss how economic integration, and particularly
the integration of labor and capital markets, affects
the fiscal systems of Europe’s welfare states. Com-
petition for increasingly mobile labor and capital
affects the benefits and costs of these policies, espe-
cially when undertaken at the level of the individual
nation-state. Competition may pressure govern-
ments to limit redistributive policies. There is a po-
tential role for coordination of welfare-state policies
among countries, possibly through “upward reas-
signment”of welfare-state policies to EU-level insti-
tutions.2
Economic integration: Why factor markets matter
The process of economic integration does not fit eas-
ily within the usual “boxes” of traditional specializa-
tions in economics.One part of economic integration
takes the form of trade in goods and services; anoth-
er part takes the form of financial flows through
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1 These in fact are often closely connected with welfare-state fiscal
policies; for example, wage and employment regulations that raise
the cost of labor can lead to unemployment, and thus to greater
unemployment insurance expenditures.
2 In order to spare readers any “trial by footnote,”this paper makes
no reference to a now-vast literature on its topic. Interested read-
ers are invited to review “Economic Integration: Implications for
Equity, Efficiency, Political Economy, and the Organization of the
Public Sector,” available on the author’s web site, and “Public
Pensions and Demographic Change in Developed Countries:
Fertility Bust and Migration Boom?”, available on request.
Readers may also wish to consult statistical tables and charts that
appear in an accompanying PowerPoint presentation.capital markets; another part deals with monetary
policy; another part concerns the migration of labor;
still another part has to do with the organizational
structure of businesses; and all of these, and their
interactions, affect overall economic performance,
fiscal systems, urban and regional economic devel-
opment, and environmental quality.
The integration of the markets for factors of produc-
tion – the markets for labor and capital – is of par-
ticular importance for the welfare state, and will be
the focus of attention here.To see why, let us return
to our sweeping generalization that the fiscal policies
of the welfare state are devoted largely to affecting
the distribution of income.Labor and capital market
integration affects both the rationale for these poli-
cies and their costs.Consider what some might think
of as a “worst-case scenario” for the welfare state.
Some fear that an unrestrained influx of low-skilled
workers may depress wages and raise unemploy-
ment in West European economies, putting in-
creased pressure on costly social policies designed to
protect the incomes of low-income people. At the
same time, the increased mobility of capital may
limit the ability of governments to capture income
from business activities or from wealthy individuals,
thus constraining the revenue-raising capacity of the
fiscal system. The integration of labor and capital
markets might thus undermine the foundations of
the welfare state, that is, its ability to take resources
from some members of society and transfer them to
others.
What for some is a “worst-case scenario” is for oth-
ers a “best-case scenario.” Countries facing competi-
tion for labor and capital may be restrained from
using the coercive power of the state to extract
resources from the politically weak and to transfer
these resources to the politically strong. Compe-
tition, in this scenario, is a force for good: it induces
governments to limit their costly and frequently
unfair interventions in markets,reducing some of the
many distortions of economic incentives created by
high taxes,generous subsidies,and restrictive regula-
tions. Competition leads to more efficient resource
allocation, rising incomes and production, and eco-
nomic growth.
Note that these two opposing characterizations of
the effects of labor and capital market integration
differ not in terms of their predictions of the eco-
nomic effects of integration but in their evaluations
of whether these effects are desirable or undesirable.
In brief, they agree that integration of labor and
capital markets might “unravel” the welfare state,
but differ as to whether this would be a welcome or
an unwelcome change.
As noted in the introduction, it is not my purpose to
opine on the desirability of the welfare state.Instead,
I would like to focus on the reasons why I consider
factor market integration to be of fundamental im-
portance for the welfare state, why it is occurring,
and what some of its implications are likely to be in
the shaping of the European economies of the
decades that lie ahead. Some of these implications
are surely favorable ones, others are perhaps less so;
thinking about these broad issues helps to bring into
focus some of the basic institutional and policy
choices that will confront the citizens of Europe in
the coming years.
Europe and the world: Demographic, economic,
and fiscal status and prospects
The background
To help lay a foundation for discussion of fiscal pol-
icy, it is helpful to summarize a few relevant facts
about demographic and economic conditions in
Europe and elsewhere. Each of these basic facts is
well known in itself, but, taken together, they carry
important implications for economic policymaking
in Europe. First, Europe is in the midst of a “fertility
bust,” the opposite of a baby boom. For some years
now, fertility rates have been at very low and histor-
ically unprecedented levels. This is true both in
Western and Eastern Europe, and in some of the
other developed countries of the world. Less-devel-
oped countries exhibit higher fertility rates and high-
er mortality rates. Mortality rates are also at histori-
cally low levels.The combination of low fertility and
low mortality means that the native European popu-
lation is aging rapidly, both in absolute terms and
relative to the world as a whole.
Second,Western Europe is rich, by world standards.
Incomes in Western Europe are well above the lev-
els found in poorer parts of the world. Per capita
incomes in neighboring regions in the Middle East
and North Africa, as well as in the Asian giants of
India and China, have been far below West Euro-
pean levels for decades, and will remain so for
decades to come, even if these economies develop
rapidly.Incomes in Eastern Europe are also substan-
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tially lower than in Western Europe, though living
standards there are certainly higher than in the truly
poor countries of the world.3
Third, governments play a major role in the
European economies. Government spending in
these economies accounts for about 40 percent of
GDP. This was certainly not true before World
War II, when the public sector was much smaller;
even as recently as the mid-1960s, total government
spending was closer to 25 percent of GDP. Unlike in
pre-twentieth century historical periods, the large
governments of modern economies engage in mas-
sive income redistribution. Today, “social expendi-
tures” (i.e., “welfare state” spending) alone amount
to some 25 percent of GDP in advanced economies.
While this redistribution takes many forms, an
important share of redistributive transfers is
accounted for by transfers to the elderly.4
Fourth, and partly in consequence of the previous
three factors, international migration plays an in-
creasing role in the demographics of Western Europe.
For the OECD European countries as a whole, net
immigration has outweighed natural increase as a
source of population growth for more than a decade.
Flows of immigration vary among countries and over
time: Germany experienced especially large immigra-
tion flows in the early and mid-1990s; Ireland, tradi-
tionally an emigration country,experienced a remark-
able migration turnaround during the mid to late
1990s; and, in recent years, Spain has experienced a
rapid increase in immigration. While the magnitudes
of immigration vary by country and from year to year,
the overall trend for Western Europe as a whole is
unmistakable: more than one million people per year
have been arriving in Western Europe, legally, every
year for more than a decade,with a cumulative inflow
of over 13 million immigrants during the period
1992–2001.5 Illegal immigration is intrinsically hard to
measure but surely amounts at least to hundreds of
thousands annually. Over the past decade and a half,
immigration has become the major determinant of
population change in Western Europe.
Fifth,increased international flows of capital accom-
pany rising migration flows.What is especially note-
worthy about capital flows is not merely that one
country or another experiences net inflows or out-
flows of capital, but that West European countries
are experiencing large gross flows of capital in both
directions. Gross inflows and outflows of foreign
direct investment have amounted to 10 to 20 percent
of total investment or more in many OECD coun-
tries for well over a decade. Foreign-affiliated firms
account for 25 to 35 percent of employment, value
added, and investment in the manufacturing sector
in major West European economies.
In short, the economies of Western Europe are rich
and aging; their governments engage in large pro-
grams of redistribution, especially but not only
toward the elderly; they are quite open to interna-
tional capital flows; and they are the destination for
millions of immigrants from other countries, most of
which are relatively poor.
Fiscal systems, demographic change, and economic
integration: Current trends and prospects 
Public pensions and demographic shifts.The aging of
the European populations,coupled with massive sys-
tems of redistribution from young to old, is placing
major stress on the fiscal systems of these countries.
The obligation to provide cash, health, and other
benefits to old people, financed by taxation of the
working population, is just like government debt: it
imposes fiscal burdens on future workers (i.e., redis-
tributes away from these workers) in order to confer
benefits on current retirees (i.e.,redistributes toward
the current elderly).This problem is not new. For at
least a decade and a half, knowledgeable observers
have drawn attention to the stresses that demo-
graphic change can create for public pension sys-
tems. The baby boom by itself, even if followed by
replacement-rate levels of fertility,would have given
rise to significant variations in the relative sizes of
different age cohorts.6 The remarkable declines in
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3A few figures based on World Bank data:In 2001,the EMU coun-
tries had a per-capita GDP of US $26,579. Per-capita GDP in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia was $2,316, in the Middle East
and North Africa it was $1,992,and in South Asia,$471.Decades of
rapid growth in poorer countries will be required to shrink these
differentials markedly.
4 Spending on old-age pensions presently amounts to about 7 per-
cent of GDP for OECD countries and is projected to rise to about
11 percent by 2050 under mid-range demographic and economic
assumptions.For France and Germany,current pension spending is
much higher and is projected to rise from the current 12 percent of
GDP to about 16 percent by 2050. (To illustrate that generaliza-
tions can be treacherous, it should be noted that the UK only
spends about 4 percent of GDP on public pensions,an amount that
is projected to fall by perhaps 0.7 percentage points by 2050.)
5 It should be emphasized that this represents immigration from
beyond the boundaries of the EU. Intra-EU migration is compara-
tively modest (though intra-EU sojourns for work or for pleasure
are very much larger).
6 History casts long demographic shadows. The age distribution in
European countries in 1950 reflected the loss of life – especially by
young and middle-aged adults – during World War II.The ensuing
baby boom represented a fertility resurgence following the reduced
fertility rates of the Great Depression and the interruption of fam-
ily formation during the war years. For both reasons, age distribu-
tions were favorably aligned for underfunded public pension sys-
tems during the 1960s and 1970s.fertility during the 1980s and 1990s mean that age
distributions are becoming exceptionally unfavor-
able for underfunded public pension systems as well
as for other elements of fiscal policy – explicit gov-
ernment borrowing is noteworthy in this respect –
that shift fiscal burdens to future working popula-
tions. The old-age dependency ratio in Western
Europe (the ratio of elderly to working-age popula-
tions) is today already at a historically-high level of
about 25 percent, and, barring either a major in-
crease in old-age mortality,emigration of the elderly,
or immigration of younger people, this ratio will in-
crease to about 50 percent by 2050.This means that
the fiscal burden of supporting the elderly will in-
crease markedly in coming decades.
Migrants to the rescue?Assuming,hopefully,that the
European populations will not suffer major increas-
es in mortality from war or disease, and that older
Europeans will not relocate,on a large scale,to other
countries, immigration provides the only path avail-
able to redress the age imbalances embedded in past
fertility and mortality experience. Immigration to
Western Europe is now quite substantial, and has
been so since about the time of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Immigration rates in Western Europe
have exceeded those in the U.S. during the past de-
cade, and immigrants to Western Europe, as has tra-
ditionally been the case for international migrants,
are indeed disproportionately young, working-age
adults. Recent immigration has thus eased the age
imbalances of Western Europe, and can continue to
do so for the indefinite future.Realistically,however,
only truly massive inflows of migrants could fully
offset the future aging of the populations of Western
Europe.7
Migrants:Part of the solution,or part of the problem?
While migrants to Western Europe are generally
young, they are not generally rich.This is naturally a
consequence of the high incomes of the destination
countries of Western Europe relative to the low
incomes of the destination countries of the rest of
the world. It is also a consequence of the relative
youthfulness of immigrants: twenty-somethings do
not attain the high earnings levels of more mature
workers, nor have they had enough years of savings
to have built up the personal wealth that older
people tend to have, on average.
Whether immigrants are net fiscal contributors or
net fiscal beneficiaries is a matter of the greatest
importance for the fiscal systems of Western Europe.
In static terms, and as a broad generalization, it
appears that immigrants may well be net fiscal bene-
ficiaries, that is, that they may impose fiscal burdens
in excess of their fiscal contributions. Studies of
immigrants in Sweden, Germany, and Denmark find
that while immigrants account for a bit more than
10 percent of the total population,they are the recip-
ients of upwards of 30 percent of total cash welfare
expenditures. Of course, a static view is necessarily
an incomplete view: as young immigrants assimilate
into local populations, gaining employment experi-
ence and enjoying increased earnings,their contribu-
tions to the fiscal system will increase relative to the
benefits that they derive from it.
But this is only a broad generalization. Some immi-
grants definitely make enormous fiscal contribu-
tions, and others definitely impose enormous fiscal
burdens, depending on their individual characteris-
tics and on the characteristics of the fiscal systems in
the countries where they reside.These are linked:the
characteristics of immigrants – their ages, incomes,
skill levels, wealth, health, and family status – are
influenced, to some degree, by public policies.When
relatively poor, low-skilled, low-wage, sick people
arrive in a modern welfare state,they tend to pay rel-
atively little in taxes and to receive relatively high
levels of fiscal benefits. When rich, highly-skilled,
high-wage, healthy people arrive in modern welfare
states,they pay a lot in taxes and qualify for relative-
ly little in welfare-state benefits. For these reasons,
welfare states stand to gain by attracting the well-off,
and to lose by attracting the badly-off, and for these
very same reasons, generous welfare states are
attractive locations for the poor and are less appeal-
ing to those who are better off.
An important question for public policy is whether
to attempt to attract more “attractive” immigrants,
by reducing fiscal burdens on those who are net fis-
cal contributors, and whether to reduce the flows of
“unattractive”immigrants by reducing fiscal benefits
for those who are net fiscal beneficiaries.This indeed
could amount to a scaling back or unraveling of wel-
fare state redistributive policies – the “best-case” or
“worst-case” scenarios described above.Tax cuts for
the rich, benefit cuts for the poor, better fiscal terms
for young workers, and reduced retirement and
health benefits for the elderly are all examples of fis-
cal reforms that would reduce the fiscal burdens on
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7 A UN study found that immigration inflows would have to rise
from current levels of about 1.5 million annually to about 13 mil-
lion annually to keep old-age dependency ratios at current levels
through 2050, by which time cumulative immigration in Western
Europe would have risen by about 700 million people.CESifo Forum 3/2004 23
net fiscal contributors as well as the fiscal benefits
received by net beneficiaries.
Fiscal Competition: Labor and capital both? Just as
countries might alter their fiscal treatment of indi-
viduals in response to the migration of people, so
they might also wish to alter their fiscal treatment of
businesses. Investment can be attractive in part
because businesses pay taxes, or because it stimu-
lates growth in employment,output,and income that
lead to rising tax revenues and declining welfare-
state expenditures.How,then,to attract investment?
Lighter tax burdens, coupled perhaps with subsidies
or with public expenditures on infrastructure or
other public services that raise profitability, provide
a set of policy tools that can influence investment
flows. Of course, the process of reforming fiscal poli-
cies to attract investment is likely to reduce the net
fiscal contribution generated by investment, in the
same way that fiscal competition for people will tend
to limit the net fiscal contributions and benefits paid
or received by migrants.
To summarize the discussion so far:the aging and rich
societies of Western Europe face present and
prospective fiscal imbalances associated with their
extensive programs of redistribution. Thanks to their
high incomes and perhaps also,in part,thanks to their
fiscal systems, they are attracting millions of immi-
grants from around the world.Capital mobility is also
now a well-established characteristic of these econo-
mies. Since capital and population flows are affected
by economic conditions, nations must compete for
labor and capital,and fiscal policies – tax and transfer
policies,especially – are one principal means by which
they can do this.Competition encourages countries to
reduce the amount of burden that they impose on
people and businesses that are net fiscal contributors,
and to reduce the amount of benefits that they pro-
vide to those that are net fiscal burdens. In this way,
competition tends to bring fiscal benefits and contri-
butions into alignment for people and for businesses,
and thus to reduce the extent of redistribution – that
is, to reduce the size of the welfare-state.
Policy and institutional responses to fiscal 
competition
Is the welfare state doomed? Will competitive pres-
sures lead to a “race to the bottom” in which taxes
and expenditures are driven down to dramatically
lower levels? There are several reasons to think not.
First, the phrase “race to the bottom” is highly mis-
leading.To see why,think about competition among
businesses. Do businesses in competitive industries
race to a situation of zero prices? Certainly not,
even though it is possible for any one business to
attract many customers by reducing its prices. In
business, competitive pressures lead to prices that
reflect costs,rather than the pricing power associat-
ed with monopoly. Competition keeps the prices of
Rolls Royce automobiles or 20-room mansions
very high: their prices will never approach zero
because these cars and dwellings are costly to pro-
duce. Similarly, in the fiscal sphere, competition
does not lead to zero public expenditures or to zero
taxes. Rather, it leads to a revenue system that
reflects the costs of public services. When govern-
ments incur heavy costs from providing public ser-
vices to businesses or to households, competitive
pressures would lead them also to recover these
costs through taxes, fees, and charges that reflect
these costs.This may mean reductions in social ben-
efits to the poor.But it may also mean privatization
of loss-making public enterprises (whose customers
are no longer the recipients of subsidies from tax-
payers), reductions of subsidies to politically
favored regions or industries, or higher tuitions and
fees for students attending universities. Further-
more, political resistance to productive public
expenditures – on education, infrastructure, health
services, or transportation – is bound to diminish
when these activities are financed not by transfers
from the general taxpaying population but from
revenues derived from those on whose behalf these
expenditures are made.
By way of example: state and local governments in
the U.S. vary widely in their provision of public
goods and services and in their levels of taxation. In
general, the fiscal systems of these units of govern-
ment tend not to be highly redistributive – at least,
not by comparison with the redistribution undertak-
en at the national level.8 Competition among these
governments has not led to a “withering away” of
public expenditures and taxation. There are some
places where some types of public services are very
good – and costly – and other places where public
services, and the taxes that support them, are more
limited.In other words,competition sometimes leads
to high levels of public service provision.
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8 As one simple indicator of the amount of redistribution embed-
ded in the federal tax system, one may note that the top 2 percent
of taxpayers paid over 40 percent of personal income taxes in 2002.
No state or locality imposes fiscal burdens of this magnitude on its
high-income taxpayers.Second, and more importantly, it is crucial to recog-
nize that economic integration is not,or at least need
not be, a zero-sum game. When driven by market
forces, migration and capital flows tend to raise pro-
ductivity and incomes,as workers and businesses are
attracted to places and uses where they are highly
valued and away from places and uses where they
are less productive. The importance of this basic
observation should not be underestimated. From its
inception, liberalization of markets has been one of
the underlying foundation principles of the
EEC/EU. This certainly includes liberalization of
trade in goods and services, through the progressive
reduction of trade barriers, but it also includes liber-
alization of labor and capital markets. Economists
struggle to understand the process of economic
growth and development, but none would dispute
the role of markets as fundamental resource alloca-
tion mechanisms that have raised West European
living standards far above those found in poorer
regions of the world.Increased scope for freedom of
commerce and employment, embodied in the Treaty
of Rome and extended to ever more countries as the
EU has gone through successive expansions, con-
tains the promise of continued economic growth and
increased prosperity.
In European experience to date, migration from out-
side the EU has featured more prominently than
intra-EU migration. The recent accession of numer-
ous East European nations means that significant
amounts of erstwhile extra-EU migration will now
become intra-EU migration. Quite aside from the
impact of eastward EU expansion, however, labor
and capital mobility will play an important and grow-
ing role in the future development of the European
economic region, at least if US experience is any
guide. Interregional flows of labor and capital are a
durable feature of the U.S.’s highly-integrated market
economy, and mobility is especially prevalent among
the better-educated workers that comprise a persis-
tently rising fraction of the workforce.9 To date,
migration from outside of the EU has been especial-
ly important,but Europe’s young professional classes
will surely follow career paths that are increasingly
EU-wide,especially as they work in modern business
enterprises with EU-wide operations.
While the linkage between economic develop-
ment and the growth of the welfare state is com-
plex, it is an inescapable fact that welfare states
flourish in rich countries, not in poor ones.
“Unwinding” some welfare-state redistributive
policies, for example by reducing taxes and trans-
fers, may be an important element in growth-pro-
moting economic reforms, and fiscal competition
in increasingly integrated markets for labor and
capital will likely create pressures for such
reforms. Perhaps more prosperous economies will
be more unequal ones. But there is no reason to
expect that the political forces that have made the
modern welfare state such a characteristic feature
of prosperous democratic societies will disappear
over time.
Third, however, implementation of welfare-state
policies may become increasingly difficult for
individual countries due to competitive pressures.
As mentioned earlier, competition among states
and regions within the U.S. has not resulted in a
race to the bottom in taxes and public services,
but it may well have contributed to limits on the
amount of fiscal redistribution by lower levels of
government.Public pensions in the U.S.,which (as
in many EU countries) are a major element in the
system of intergenerational redistribution, are a
responsibility of the national government. Gov-
ernment borrowing, another form of intergenera-
tional redistribution, is also far larger at the
national level than at the level of subnational gov-
ernments. The national government gives gener-
ous financial support to the state governments in
their expenditures for major programs of cash and
health benefits (AFDC/TANF and Medicaid) for
the poor, and perhaps these benefits would be far
smaller if their financing were left entirely to the
states.
It is possible that the Member States of the EU will
increasingly find themselves in a competitive envi-
ronment like that facing states in the U.S., and that
nations that were able to sustain large redistributive
programs in earlier decades will find themselves
under increasing pressure to reduce the scale of re-
distribution. Under these circumstances, national
governments may decide to resist competitive pres-
sures by coordinating their redistributive policies,for
example by maintaining high income tax rates or by
maintaining standard levels of income, housing, or
health benefits for the poor. Detailed coordination
of policy is difficult, however.
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9 The U.S., like the EU countries, is the destination for significant
numbers of international migrants.International migration,howev-
er, is small in magnitude compared to migration among regions
within the U.S. For the past half-century and more, each year has
witnessed large movements of people among states and regions
(gross migration flows dwarf net migration flows), showing no ten-
dency to subside over time. Reallocation of labor and capital
among regions is evidently part of the US economy’s response to
ever-shifting market conditions.CESifo Forum 3/2004 25
An alternative would be to reassign major redistrib-
utive functions upward to the level of EU adminis-
trative units. Of course, this just transfers the politi-
cal problem of coordinating policies among coun-
tries to the political problem of deciding how to
share the costs of redistribution among countries
and how to set the levels of benefits on an EU-wide
basis.10
Neither solution is a politically easy one, nor are
these alternatives mutually exclusive. The experi-
ence of US states indicates that coordination of
fiscal policy, even in the presence of a powerful
superior government, is challenging, to say the
least. To take one example, in the sphere of busi-
ness income taxation, the states generally define
business income in somewhat different ways,apply
different rules to the division of income among
jurisdictions for tax purposes (apportionment/
allocation rules differ widely), and choose quite
different rates of taxation (from zero to about
10 percent on corporate net incomes).This is true
even though these states share common legal and
administrative traditions, and even though they
generally rely on Federal government income tax-
ation to determine the starting point for state
income taxes. How much harder will it be for the
EU countries to negotiate consistent principles
and practices for the taxation of income from busi-
ness activities?
On the other hand, delegation of responsibility for
fiscal policy to higher-level institutions like the EU is
also a difficult undertaking.The establishment of the
social and regional development funds represent
halting first steps toward EU-wide expenditure poli-
cies. The recent accession of East European nations
to the EU will complicate the already problematic
implementation of EU-wide social and development
expenditure policies.The building of the institution-
al structures for the redistributive policies of modern
welfare states took place over centuries. The estab-
lishment of EU-wide institutions that could super-
sede national government authority in this area, if it
occurs at all, surely will require some decades of
institutional evolution.
Conclusion
Labor and capital mobility are important elements
in the overall process of economic integration in
Europe. People from Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union,the Middle East,South and East Asia,
and Latin America are attracted to the high present
and future earnings, and in some cases to the social
benefits that life in Europe can offer. Migration and
capital mobility within Europe,and especially within
the expanded EU, are likely to be increasingly sig-
nificant features of the EU regional economy.
Because the welfare states of Europe .redistribute
incomes on a large scale, inflows and outflows of
capital or labor can expand or contract the sources
of revenues, and the populations of welfare state
beneficiaries,in ways that can enhance or undermine
fiscal balance and thus the sustainability of redistrib-
utive policies.
In order to attract workers and investment that are
positive net contributors to the fiscal system, a
nation can choose combinations of tax and expendi-
ture policies that offer more favorable fiscal treat-
ment. Less favorable fiscal treatment for net fiscal
beneficiaries – the poor, the sick, the elderly – can
discourage their entry into a country. The fiscal
stresses associated with population aging, the in-
creasing ease of migration resulting from improved
transportation and communications and the falling
costs of information,and large and persistent income
differentials between Western Europe and the poor
countries of the world all can be expected to intensi-
fy fiscal competition and put pressures on EU
nations to limit, to some degree, the extent of redis-
tributive policies that they undertake. Coordination
of redistributive policies can limit the extent of fiscal
competition. Delegation of responsibility for redis-
tributive policies to EU-level institutions can also
mitigate competitive pressures on the welfare state.
It would be difficult for the original EC Member
States, or even the Benelux countries alone, to sacri-
fice the policy-making autonomy implied by such
coordination or upward delegation of fiscal respon-
sibilities. For the now expanded EU, a very diverse
population of nations with quite different adminis-
trative, legal, political, and fiscal traditions and insti-
tutions, coordination or delegation of policy-making
authority is likely to be especially challenging, and
will certainly evolve, if at all, only gradually.
The positive impacts of economic integration must
never be neglected. Mobility of labor and capital
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10 To illustrate just one of the many difficulties that arises in the
“upward reassignment”approach:the mix of old and young people
differs among EU Member States. Those with disproportionate
numbers of old would benefit from off-loading costly public pen-
sion programs to other EU countries by making public pensions an
EU-wide responsibility, but those with higher proportions of
younger workers would then bear disproportionate shares of the
fiscal burden. In the give and take of political haggling, these prob-
lems are potentially soluble through the use of direct or indirect
compensatory transfers or other forms of logrolling.expands economic opportunities for workers and
promotes economic growth and development.
Prosperity is a critical underpinning of the welfare
state. Enhanced economic growth in Europe, partly
attributable to liberalization and integration of fac-
tor markets, can contribute to the future prosperity
not only of native Europeans but of people around
the world. The process of sorting out the proper
functions of government in an integrated world is
complex and time-consuming,and this evolution will
not produce universally-shared benefits.But growth-
enhancing economic reforms increase the opportuni-
ties for widely-shared improvements in living stan-
dards, and the experience of modern advanced
democracies should reassure us that concern for fair-
ness will always figure prominently in the evolution
of economic policy.
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